Abstract-Different types and techniques of DDoS attacks & defense are studied in this paper with some recent informat ion on attacks dominated in year 2012 (1st Quarter). We further provide simu lation based analysis of an FTP server"s performance in a typical enterprise network under distributed denial of service attack. Simulat ions in OPNET show noticeable variations in connection capacity, task processing and delay parameters of the attacked server as compared to the performance without attack. DDoS detection and mit igation mechanisms discuss ed in this paper main ly focus on some recently investigated techniques. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the basis of survey based study as well as simulation results.
I. Introduction
Distributed Denial of Service attacks [1] are exercised by attackers in various forms. These attacks vary fro m single attacking source to a networked attacking in frastructure. They also vary in degree of automation, fro m manual efforts to fu lly automated attacks.
In networked form, a botnet of attacking sources is created. These machines are vulnerab le on internet and attackers exploit their vulnerabilities to control them for generating attacks against a victim. These co mpro mised mach ines are called "zo mbies". Moreover, there are many automated tools available to generate DDoS attacks. These software tools perform almost everything for attacker; such as port scanning, identifying victim"s vulnerabilities and protocol loopholes etc. An attacker just configures parameters of attack and the rest is done by automated tools [1] [2] .
DDoS attack is a co mmon extension of DoS attacks in which the attacking power is increased with numerous attacking sources which are under attacker"s control (it refers to "zo mbies" in a "botnet"). A broader classification of DoS attacks is provided in Fig. 1 . In above classificat ion [1] , Netwo rk Device Level attack exploits a router"s weak point. OS Level attack exploit"s OS vulnerability. Application Level attack determines application"s vulnerability through port scanning. Data Flood refers to flooding a network or server"s connection points to deny services for legitimate clients. This is achieved by sending huge traffic (data packets) towards v ictim. The protocol feature attack exp loits some protocol"s weak point such as the requirement of final acknowledgement fro m client by the server in TCP"s three-way handshake.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some co mmon DDoS attacks. Section 3 identifies some recent trends of DDoS attacks . Section 4 presents techniques of DDoS attack detection & mitigation. Section 5 presents the simulation analysis. Conclusion is made in the final section.
II. Some Common DDoS Attacks

Direct and Reflector Attacks
In direct DDoS attacks, zo mbies directly attack the victim as shown in Fig. 2 . On the other hand, in reflector attacks, zo mb ies send request packets with spoofed IP (IP of vict im) in source address field of IP packets to a number of other vulnerab le co mputer devices (PCs, routers etc.) and rep lies generated fro m such devices are routed towards the victim fo r an impact desired by attacker. In such a way, reflect ion of the traffic is seen in these attacks [3] . A classic example is sending "ping" requests with spoofed source IP. In such a case, "ping" replies are sent towards victim. In this way, the attacker is successful in saturating victim"s bandwidth. Architecture of reflector attack is shown in Fig. 3 . In direct DDoS attacks, attacker proceeds with instructions to "Handlers" which perform Co mmand & Control operations to control zo mbies. Moreover, zo mbies directly attack vict ims and also pass the informat ion to handlers [2] . In reflector attacks, modus operandi is almost the same but zo mbies further explo it reflectors (mach ines on targeted victim"s network) to flood victim with huge amount of traffic (IP packets).
Application Layer DDoS Attacks
Since DDoS attacks are very old technique, there have been many researches and imp lementations to counter such attacks. Many forms of DDoS attack detection and mitigation are now available. However, the major focus of attackers in earlier t imes has been towards exhausting victim"s services for legitimate users through network layer (layer 3) attacks i.e. modifying IP packet fields or flooding victim"s network with data packets. However, as many defenses are now available against such attacks, attackers have also changed their strategies and started focusing on attacks of application layer (layer 7) [3] . In such attacks, no man ipulation is done in IP packets on network layer level; instead, complete TCP connections are made with victim just like leg itimate clients. In table 1, d ifferent forms o f co mmon DDo S attacks in network and applicat ion layers are mentioned. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 depict normal TCP three-way handshake operation and TCP ACK attack formation respectively. Sending huge amount of UDP packets towards victim"s bandwidth.
Network Congestion due to unavailability of bandwidth to legitimate clients.
ICMP Flood
Sending huge amount of ICMP packets towards victim"s bandwidth.
T CP Flood
Initiating large number of TCP connections (of spoofed packets) with victim and not acknowledging the same (known as T CP ACK attack)
Unanswered Requests due to unavailability of connections for legitimate clients (Connection buffer i.e. capacity is limited on a given server).
Application
HT T P Flood
Establishing large number of TCP connections with victim and sending requests for heavy processing through HTTP communication.
Unanswered Requests due to unavailability of server"s processing cycles for legitimate clients (All processing remains busy for answering attacker"s requests of heavy processing).
HTTPS Flood
Establishing large number of TCP connections with victim and sending requests for heavy processing through HTTPS communication.
FT P Flood
Establishing large number of TCP connections with victim and sending requests for heavy processing through FTP communication.
Unanswered Requests due to unavailability of server"s processing cycles for legitimate clients (All processing remains busy for answering attacker"s requests of heavy processing). 
DDoS Attacks in Wireless Networks
Wireless networks are vulnerable to many kinds of attacks including distributed denial of service attacks. Their main vulnerability is shared wireless mediu m due to which many attacks are possible to exploit and compro mise wireless stations. It is possible in almost all variations of wireless networks such as Wireless sensor networks (WSN), Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) and Wireless local area networks (WLAN) [4] [5] [6] [7] . Like traditional wired networks, DDoS attacks on wireless networks are also possible in different layers of communicat ion. So me co mmon forms of DDoS attacks in different layers of wireless networks are indicated in table 2. choke the commun ication med iu m. In this way, a denial of service effect is observed for legitimate clients on the network [5] .
III. Some Recent DDoS Attack Trends
In this section, we survey a few recent DDo S attack trends on various networks connected to the Internet. We select "Pro lexic Attack Report Q1 2012" of Prolexic Technologies [8] for this analysis. Prolexic Technologies is a trusted DDoS attack mitigation provider in world. The data provided in this analysis covers all attacks dealt by Prolexic throughout the world during first quarter of year 2012.
DDoS Attacks on Financial Sector Networks
In Fig. 6 , huge upward shift of DDoS attack mit igation can be observed in statistics of "Total bits mit igated" and "Total packets mitigated" in first quarter of 2012 (co mpared with last quarter of 2011) in world"s financial sector networks. The data shows that DDoS attacks have been increased manifold as well as the need of stronger defense against such attacks in financial sector networks. It is exp licit ly mentioned on the cover page of attack report of Pro lexic Technologies that "Financial services firms get hit by DDoS attacks as malicious packet volume increases 3,000% quarter over quarter". In quarter 4 of 2011, 19.1 TB (Terabytes) of data and 14 b illion packets of malicious traffic were mit igated by Prolexic. In first quarter of 2012, a significant increase was observed in malicious traffic with 65 TB of data and 1.1 t rillion packets being identified and mit igated. It is further observed that aggregate attack mit igation time in seconds has also been increased more than twice. It shows that attackers are using more sophisticated and automated tools to launch larger magn itudes of attacks at rapid speed for which the defense has to be fast as well. The attackers now seem to be more focused towards financial sectors with evolving strategies. Moreover, the average attack length in seconds has been decreased indicating that the attack tools are now quicker to generate a deeper impact in lesser time.
DDoS Attacks on All Networks
We further provide some informat ion regarding DDoS attack statistics of first quarter of 2012 in all sectors throughout the world including financial sector networks. So me key info rmation ext racted fro m the attack report of Prolexic Technologies regarding first quarter of 2012 is:
1. 25% increase in DDoS attacks*.
2. 25% increase in application layer DDoS attacks*. 
IV. DDoS Attack Detection & Mitigation
Accurate detection and mitigation of DDo S attacks is a difficult task even today, when we have large number of detection & mit igation tools available. Application layer DDoS attacks are even harder to mit igate due to their leg itimate-like traffic features. However, some recent research efforts indicate that researchers are now focused to devise methods of detecting and mitigating application layer DDoS attacks. Moreover, some evolutionary methods of defense against DDo S attacks have been tested in research for some years.
In table 3, so me co mmon methods of DDoS detection and mitigation are mentioned which correspond to new dimensions of defense against DDoS attacks as compared to traditional & older methods which have been used for many years e.g. traceback, entropy variations, common traffic ano malies & packet filtering techniques.
T able 3: Some common DDoS mitigation techniques (Evolutionary methods)
Basis of Defense Method
Neural Networks [9] [10] [11] Magnitude of attack (number of zombies and attack rate) identification through back propagation neural network.
Magnitude of attack (number of zombies and attack rate) identification through LVQ model of neural network.
Botnet Fluxing [2]
Fast Flux (IP addresses of same domain are frequently changed).
Domain Flux (Domain names of same IP address are frequently changed).
Defense Mechanism in Switching / Routing Devices [12] Packet Forwarding / T CP Blocking in routers.
T PM hardware chip in switches.
The schemes mentioned in 
Basis of Defense Method
Network-wide monitoring [13] Observing shift in spatial-temporal patterns of network traffic on occurrence of DDoS attack.
Changes in network"s aggregate traffic anomalies [14] Observing packet size and traffic rate parameters through proposed bPDM mechanism to calculate probability ratio test.
Observing changes in network"s traffic anomalies through proposed metric [15] Observing traffic rate, access changes and IP address distribution parameters through proposed hybrid probability metric to analyze proposed grouping thresholds i.e. "similarity index" and "variation".
Observing document popularity in real time web traffic [16] Observing spatial-temporal patterns of real time web traffic in flash crowd events and analyzing changes on occurrence of DDoS attack through document popularity.
Automated client puzzle [17] Presenting CAPTHA puzzle images to clients to avoid machine based automated DDoS attacks.
A real challenge in designing defense against application layer DDo S attacks is distinguishing attacking patterns from sudden increase in legitimate requests (referred as "flash crowd"). As same type of traffic behavior is observed in both forms of connections / requests, an effective mechanism of discriminating them fro m each other is harder to achieve and implement. Research against application layer DDoS attacks also mainly focus on discriminating application layer DDoS attacks fro m flash crowd events. CAPTCHA (Co mp letely Automated Public Turing test to tell Co mputers and Hu mans Apart) puzzle is a promising technique to mit igate applicat ion layer DDoS attacks. The client has to pass a challenge-response test to establish connection with a server. In table 5, some latest research efforts against DDoS attacks are highlighted to provide mo re insight of related informat ion to readers . All research efforts cited in table 5 have been published not before year 2012.
T able 5: Some latest research efforts on DDoS mitigation
Scheme Method
Adaptive Probabilistic Marking (APM) [18] Observing TTL fields of packets to initiate proposed traceback scheme and reconstruction of attacking path on occurrence of DDoS attack.
Adaptive Selective Verification (ASV) [19] Increasing legitimate request rate (in adaptive manner upto a threshold level) in consecutive time windows by legitimate clients on occurrence of DDoS attack.
T raffic Pattern Analysis [20] Observing changes in traffic flow and analyzing patterns using Pearson"s correlation coefficient to calculate standard deviations of observed parameters. The analysis to distinguish DDoS attacks from legitimate activities is made through proposed algorithms.
LOT Defense [21] Establishing tunnel between two communicating gateways through proposed lightweight protocol to prevent traffic against IP spoofing and flooding attacks.
V. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we simu late a hypothetically considered enterprise network under DDoS attack (network"s FTP server is under application layer DDoS attack). The simu lations are performed in OPNET, an industry accepted simulat ion tool for its realistic analysis of networking performance measurements [22] . 
Baseline Scenario
A baseline scenario is considered as shown in Fig. 11 . We have a server setup at one end with FTP, Database and Web servers. On the same side of network, we have a LAN (Local Area Network) of local users. The LAN is configured with 100 Base-T settings and it is terminated at LAN router"s ethernet interface. Number of users in this LAN is configured as 10 and they are all active. Effectively, they can also use switch interface as they are local users, the routing is therefore not required to access the servers. LAN router is however utilized to provide ethernet interface to the local users" LAN for connection purpose. In addition to this, we also have a group of remote users; say at s ome remote site, connected with the network through remote router "Router-1", the IP cloud (internet) and a firewall. The connectivity of remote users is accomplished with VPN (Virtual Private Network). They are all on the same LAN at remote site which is configured with 100 Base-T settings and connected with the ethernet interface of Router-1. Nu mber of users in this remote LAN is configured as 5 and they are all act ive as well. So me properties of servers used in the network are mentioned in table 6. 
Attack Scenario
In attack scenario, all configurat ions remain the same as they are in baseline scenario. In addit ion to this, we assume that an "Attacker" has got control of a botnet (handlers and zombies) and succeeded to pass through the firewall of considered network. It is out of the scope of this analysis how the attacker gets success in controlling the botnet and penetrating the firewall. Ult imately, the attacker launches DDoS attack on network"s FTP server. The attack scenario is shown in Fig. 12 .
Simulation Results & Discussions
In our simu lation analysis, we select a few performance metrics which are normally not considered while analy zing network"s behavior under attack scenarios. Usually, the focus remains towards network traffic, its flow and aggregation. However, we obtain some server side parameters to analyze the effect of DDoS attack on server performance along with protocol delay (TCP delay). The fo llo wing parameters are considered:
(a) CPU utilizat ion and Load (connection requests) on attacked FTP server.
(b) TCP active connection counts of server.
(c) TCP delay in server.
(d) Task processing time of server.
(e) Effect on all above parameters with respect to the change in botnet size.
In order to observe botnet size effect, we consider three botnet sizes with 50, 100 and 200 zo mb ies. It is assumed that handlers are located within botnet and included in the mentioned botnet sizes. We observe the parameters with respect to simulation time of one hour.
CPU Utilization (%)
We observe that CPU utilizat ion in FTP server under baseline scenario is min imal, whereas it increases man ifold under attack scenario. Moreover, it is found that increasing botnet size has proportional effect on the CPU utilizat ion i.e. CPU utilization is also increased. This is because as more traffic is sent by the attacker to exhaust the service, more processing is required to process incoming requests by the server. As a result, server is incapable to effectively respond the legitimate requests. In this analysis, CPU utilizat ion of FTP server has increased more than 300 t imes (percentage utilizat ion) at peak value when the server is under DDoS attack with 200 zo mbies as compared to the baseline scenario.
Load on FTP Server (requests/sec)
It is observed that load on FTP server is not very high when legitimate users commun icate under baseline scenario. On the other hand, when DDoS attack strikes under attack scenario, we observe a shoot in FTP server load with increased connection requests. It is found fro m the obtained relat ionship that increased botnet size makes greater impact on server load. The reason behind the fact is that the attacker is sending more traffic to init iate connection requests for which the server responds and hence the load is increased. The ultimate target of attacker in this perspective is to degrade the server"s connection capacity for legitimate requests .
We observe that the average load of 0.8 requests per second is experienced by the server at peak value under attack scenario with 200 zo mbies as co mpared to 0.1 requests per second under baseline scenario, hence showing 8 times increase per second.
TCP Active Connection Counts & Delay (sec)
We observe that active connection counts under attack scenario greatly increase as co mpared to the baseline scenario. It shows how much the server is getting exhausted in connection management processing of attack based traffic so that legitimate users will find a denial in connection establishment with the server. The peak value in our analysis has 225 active connection counts on FTP server under DDoS attack with 200 zo mbies as co mpared to average value of only 0.06 counts under baseline scenario. Moreover, increased botnet size exhib its more connection count load on the server.
In Fig. 13 , we observe TCP delay and find that the attack scenario induces additional transport layer delay at server"s port which is about 25% more than the delay observed in baseline scenario. It shows that DDoS attack also makes the response of server slow in its connection establishment & maintenance capacity. Moreover, the increased magnitude of attack (increased size of the botnet) has comparatively larger delay effect on the server in the considered network. 
Task Processing Time (sec)
In Fig. 14 , task processing time of FTP server is observed. We find that task processing time great ly increases under attack scenario as compared to baseline scenario. It depicts that the server is made exhausted by sending huge amount of attack traffic for wh ich it has to perform requested tasks. As a result, average processing time (in seconds) per task is increased, degrading services for legitimate requests. A 50 fold increase is observed in average task processing time of the server when it becomes under DDoS attack. Moreover, the increased magnitude of attack (increased size of the botnet) induces more delay factor in average processing time per task of the server.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a review on some co mmon techniques of Distributed Denial of Serv ice attacks and defenses with an emphasis on recently researched and proposed schemes of defense. We also discussed some statistics on DDoS attacks recorded in year 2012 Quarter-1 and presented simulation based performance analysis of an FTP server in scenario of an enterprise network under distributed denial of service attack. Simu lations in OPNET showed noticeable variations in connection capacity, task processing and delay parameters of the attacked server as compared to the performance without attack. Botnet size effect on the obtained parameters was observed by considering three botnet sizes i.e. 50, 100 and 200 zo mbies. We get an idea that application layer DDoS attacks are increasing and their accurate detection is a difficult task and major challenge of future research.
